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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: http://www.iue.it/RSC/ 
PublicationsRSC-Welcome.htm. In 1999, the Centre merged with the 
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The Mediterranean Programme was established at the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Autumn 1998. The 
Mediterranean Programme has two long-term strategic objectives. First, to 
provide education and conduct research which combines in-depth knowledge of 
the Middle East and North Africa, of Europe, and of the relationship between 
the Middle East and North Africa and Europe. Second, to promote awareness of 
the fact that the developments of the Mediterranean area and Europe are 
inseparable. The Mediterranean Programme will provide post-doctoral and 
doctoral education and conduct high-level innovative scientific research.
The Mediterranean Programme has received generous financial support for 
Socio-Political Studies from three major institutions who have guaranteed their 
support for four years: ENI S.p.A, Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, and 
Mediocredito Centrale. The European Investment Bank, Compagnia di San 
Paolo and Monte dei Paschi di Siena have offered generous financial support 
for four years for studies in Political Economy which will be launched in Spring 
2000. In addition, a number of grants and fellowships for nationals of the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries have been made available by the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for doctoral students) and the City of 
Florence (Giorgio La Pira Fellowship for post-doctoral fellows).
For further information:
Mediterranean Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
via dei Roccettini, 9
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy





























































































This article examines the relationship between big business and democracy in 
the context of neo-liberal globalization. The increasing interest displayed by big 
business in democracy in the Turkish context is explained by a mix of domestic 
and global influences. It appears that ‘democracy’ is highly valued by big 
business because its absence effectively means isolation from global norms in 
general and from the benefits of full membership of the European Union in 
particular. On the domestic front, democracy is conceived of as a necessary 
mechanism to limit arbitrary state intervention and contain redistributive 
pressures from below as well as threats from other segments of the business 
community. These findings signify a broadly instrumental view of democracy. 
The accomplishment of such notions of democracy would certainly represent an 
improvement over the existing set of arrangements. Yet such an understanding 
of democracy does not seem to signify an extension of social rights and hence 
challenge the existing power relations. The objective instead is to create a more 





























































































Business leaders and business associations are key political actors in late- 
industrializing societies. The relationship between business and democracy, 
itself, has been a source of continued controversy in the comparative literature 
on democratic transitions and democratic consolidation. The traditional view 
has been that businessmen are typically interested in stability and whenever 
considerations relating to stability come into conflict with political pluralism 
and democratic opening, they tend to swing in the direction of authoritarian 
solutions. More recent literature has drawn attention, however, to the 
increasingly progressive or favorable role that “business” or entrepreneurial 
groups can play in the process of democratic transition and consolidation1 . Our 
central objective is to explain the apparent paradox, namely the tendency on the 
part of business interests, notably big business to favor -or at least not reject on 
an outright basis- authoritarian practices in the past, versus their growing 
support for liberal democracy and political pluralism in the recent context in 
many emerging second or third wave democracies.
Motivated by these broader concerns, we shall concentrate on the case of 
TUSIAD, a voluntary interest association representing the big business or large 
conglomerates in Turkey. Turkey, itself, is an interesting case to examine from a 
comparative standpoint. It is an example of a second wave democracy, where a 
broadly open polity has existed, albeit with certain interruptions, over a period 
of four decades and yet the democratic order falls considerably short of being 
fully consolidated judged by the norms of Western style liberal democracies. 
The striking pattern in the Turkish context is that the segment of the business 
community represented by TUSIAD has become increasingly vocal in recent 
years in the plea for further democratic opening. Indeed, the Association’s
This paper was presented at the Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research 
Meeting, Florence, March 21-25, 2001, Mediterranean Programme, Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.
' For evidence on and explanation of the underlying reasons for the conversion of big business 
into a pro democratization force in the recent period in Latin America and East Asia, see 
Ernest Bartell and Leigh A. Payne, eds., Business and Democracy in Latin America 
(Pittsburgh and London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995); Chung-in Moon, "Beyond 
Statism: The Political Economy of Growth in South Korea", International Studies Notes, Vol. 
15, No. 1 (1990). On the inherent ambiguities involving the relationship between business and 
democracy in the late industrialization contexts, see Eva Beilin, "Contingent Democrats; 
Industrialists, Labor and Democratization in Late Developing Countries," World Politics, Vol. 



























































































recent publications and the pronouncements of its leaders in public have 
concentrated almost single-mindedly on legal and constitutional reforms. This 
represents a sharp contrast with the earlier pattern in the 1970s and the 1980s 
during which the organization’s efforts had focused primarily on issues of 
economic reforms, largely evading open discussion of issues relating to 
democratization and constitutional reform in the process. Clearly, a number of 
challenging questions which are of wider interest from a comparative 
perspective emerge in this context. How do we explain the striking shift in the 
preferences of the business community in the direction of participating or even 
actively leading the pro-democratization coalition? What does big business 
understand by the term “democracy” and what are the possible limits of such an 
understanding? How sensitive is the business community to the issue of “social 
rights” as opposed to “individual” and “civil” rights and how do they approach 
the issue of citizenship in this context? How do businessmen view the 
relationship between stability, arguably their fundamental concern, and 
democratization? Stated somewhat differently, what kind of democratic order 
do they have in mind or are they striving for?2
II. BUSINESS AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF NEO-LIBERAL 
GLOBALIZATION
Neo-liberal globalization as a late twentieth century phenomenon is an 
inherently contradictory process. Casual observation would suggest that its 
impact, both in terms of economic growth and prospects for dejnocracy, is 
unambiguously favorable. Market-driven globalization facilitates economic 
expansion through rapid development of technology, as well as growth in 
international trade and capital flows. In the cultural and political arena, 
authoritarian regimes can no longer isolate themselves and shield their citizens 
from the unifying influence of global norms and the devastating impact of the 
information revolution, which, in an unprecedented pace, tears down the 
national walls and brings the ‘better’ home. Increasingly, democracy is 
recognized as the norm and as a necessary counterpart of market-oriented 
reforms in a wide variety of national settings, previously dominated by 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments. Following the end of the Cold
2 Another interesting question to consider in this context is whether big business in Turkey 
can play an instrumental role in Turkey’s push for full membership of the European Union, 
rather reminiscent of the role that the business community had performed in the 
democratization processes of Greece and Spain. On the important role played by business 
interests in the transition to and consolidation of democracy in Spain, see Robert E. Martinez, 




























































































Wax and the more relaxed environment of the post-Cold War order, with the 
triumph of capitalism as an economic system, powerful actors such as the 
United States and the European Union have become much more sensitive to the 
issues of democratization and human rights in different parts of the world. 
Moving beyond the realm of powerful nation states or supra-national actors, 
human rights activism has also been encouraged via the proliferation of non­
governmental organizations forming the beginnings of a genuinely transnational 
civil society. As a consequence of these developments, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to disentangle domestic politics from transnational influences. For the 
political and business elites in emerging democracies, the costs involved in 
failure to conform to global norms are considerable. Failure to conform means 
isolation, insecurity and inability to capitalize on economic benefits such as 
large-scale investment on the part of transnational capital and membership of 
supra-national organizations such as the European Union3
A closer investigation reveals, however, that the relationship between 
neo-liberal globalization and democratization is not as linear and precise as we 
have indicated so far. Indeed, there exists a number of influences which 
complicate the relationship. First of all, the process of neo-liberal globalization 
is extremely uneven in terms of its impact with some nations, as with certain 
groups or regions within the individual nations themselves, deriving 
disproportionate advantages from this process. Significant “losers” emerge both 
in the developed and the developing countries who lack the necessary skills and 
qualifications which would allow them to capitalize on the material benefits of 
globalization. With the decline of the redistributive capacities of the nation state 
and parallel trend involving the decline in the political appeal of the Left, these 
groups increasingly direct their support to ultra-nationalist or religious 
fundamentalist political movements. It is not a paradox after all that neo-liberal 
globalization has been accompanied by the emergence of often authoritarian 
versions of identity politics, which, in turn, emerged as serious obstacles to 
democratic consolidation in a wide variety of national contexts. Emergence of 
micro nationalism and ethnic conflict has also manifested itself as a key 
destabilizing force jeopardizing the prospects for democracy by fragmenting the 
nation state.
3 On the positive linkages between globalization and democracy, see Larry Diamond and Marc 
F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore and London: The Johns 




























































































Following the work of Linz and Stepan, we may identify two 
fundamental constraints, which obstruct the path of democratic consolidation in 
many new or relatively new democratic polities: (a). Widespread income 
inequalities, often aggravated by neo-liberal reforms, which are usually 
translated into and find a political expression in terms of authoritarian forms of 
identity politics and (b). Micro nationalism and ethnic politics aimed at 
enlarging the boundaries of representation, but at the same time threatening the 
basic existence and units of the individual nation states, still the sole 
institutional structure to successfully accommodate democracy4.
At a different level of analysis or discourse, commentators approaching 
the issue from a radical democracy perspective have drawn attention to the 
absence of choice among genuine alternatives in the type of democracies which 
emerge in the context of neo-liberal globalization. The terms “low intensity 
democracy”, “illiberal democracy”, “the politics of anti-politics” or “the limits 
of politics” all point towards a common tendency, namely an inherently weak or 
superficial democratic order, in which recognition or representation do not 
necessarily imply the presence of a significant capacity to transform the existing 
set of power relations 5. We can argue that the type of democratic order which 
accompanies neo-liberal globalization is an inherently contradictory process. It 
involves an expansion of certain types of rights notably “individual” or “civil” 
rights. Citizenship rights are increasingly defined in relation to the norms of the 
"free market". Consequently, a disproportionate degree of emphasis is placed on 
the extension and consolidation of "property rights" and "consumer rights". At 
same time, however, neo-liberal globalization tends to produce a certain type of 
illiberal democracy by leading to a contraction of other kinds of rights, notably, 
"social rights", in spite of the increasing demands on the part of different social 
groups or identities towards greater recognition and representation. Arguably,
4 On neo-liberal globalization, inequality and the rise of often authoritarian and destabilizing 
form of identity politics, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Toward Consolidated 
Democracies", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1996), 14-33; and for a pessimistic 
evaluation and emphasis on the negative linkages between globalization and democracy from 
a radical democracy perspective, see Benjamin Barber, "Can Democracy Survive 
Globalization?", Government and Opposition, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2000), 275-301
5 On the “illiberal” or “low intensity” democracy and “the politics of anti politics” or “limits 
of politics” theses see Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, 
(November/December 1997), 22-43. For a critical assessment concerning the implications of 
neo-liberal globalization for "citizenship", particularly with reference to the emerging 
democratic regimes in Latin America, see Philip Oxhom "Social Inequality, Civil Society and 
the Limits of Citizenship in Latin America" in Susan Eckstein and Timothy Wickham- 





























































































the concept of citizenship loses its true meaning in an environment where social 
rights are increasingly undermined and "rights", in general, are interpreted in a 
rather narrow fashion as entitlements dictated through the logic of the market. A 
central conclusion which emerges is that we need to analyze the relationship 
between business and democracy within the parameters of the broad and at the 
same time contradictory environment which is emerging in the current era of 
global neo-liberalism.
Turning to the question of why big business, in particular, wants 
democratization in the current international context, we may put forward the 
following set of hypotheses. In general, elites’ support for democracy is often 
based on self-interest and is, therefore, necessarily fragile and conditional 6 7. As 
Adam Prezoworski emphasized, democratization is possible “if there exist 
institutions that provide a reasonable expectation that interests of major political 
forces would not be affected highly adversely under democratic competition, 
given the resources that these forces can muster” 1. Elite groups will support 
democracy only in so far as they feel certain that their interests will be backed 
after under more democratic conditions. The logical corollary of this 
proposition is that business wants more, democracy because it feels more secure 
in terms of property rights, legitimacy of its dominant status in society and the 
weakness of demands for radical redistribution from below in the current 
international order, compared to the position it occupied two or three decades 
ago. Furthermore, business elites realize that the economic costs of not 
conforming to global norms of democracy would be quite considerable, a 
situation which was clearly not the case during the Cold War order. Hence, if 
we are to understand the recent shift involving business as an active member of 
the_pra-xlemQcratization coalition, self-interest ought to be the proper starting 
place.
6 See in this context George Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization (Boulder, San 
Fransisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993)
7 See Adam Prezoworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts" in Jone Elster 
and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988) pp. 59-81. Also relevant in this context is David G. Becker, "Beyond 
Dependency, Development and Democracy in the Era of International Capitalism" in 
Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson, eds., Comparative Political Dynamics: 




























































































III. THE ORIGINS OF TUSIAD’S DEMOCRATIZATION DRIVE IN 
TURKEY: EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC INFLUENCES
The origins of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association 
(TUSiAD) may be traced back to April 1971. Twelve leading Turkish 
industrialists have played an active and instrumental role in the emergence of 
the Association. The foundation of TUSIAD was a landmark in the sense that it 
represented the first voluntary association of businessmen in Turkey. 
Previously, the whole of the business community, regardless of size, had been 
represented exclusively by a single, semi-official organization, namely the 
Turkish Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges (TOBB). Furthermore, the 
foundation of TUSIAD marked the emergence of the big business as a crucial 
political actor in the Turkish context in terms of both defending their collective 
interests against other segments of society, but also for the first time expressing 
a collective concern about the social, political and economic problems of the 
country as a whole.
The close relationship between big business and the state in Turkey and 
evolution of TUSIAD over the past three decades have been widely discussed 
and documented 8. What is significant in the present context is that TUSIAD 
itself has undergone a significant transformation since its inception, a process 
which has been closely shaped and influenced by dramatic changes taking place 
within the domestic political economy as well as in the international 
environment. In retrospect, the evolution of TUSIAD may be usefully 
decomposed into three distinct stages. The first phase corresponds to the 1970s, 
as a period during which the dominant import-substitution model of 
industrialization (ISI) reached a crisis point, a process aggravated further by a 
series of severe external shocks 9. Leading industrialists who had benefited from
8 On the relationship between big business and the state in Turkey, see Çaglar Keyder, State 
and Class in Turkey (London: Verso, 1987); Ay§e Bugra, State and Business in Modem 
Turkey: A Comparative Study (Albany: State University of New York Press 1994), 
“Ideological and Political Contradictions of Capitalism in the Late Industrializing Countries”, 
in Michele Cangiani, ed., The Milano Papers, Essays in Societal Alternatives (Montréal, New 
York, London: Black Rose Books, 1997), pp. 97-111; and Metin Heper and E. Fuat Keyman, 
“Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey”, 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1998), 259-277. On the evolution of TÜSIAD since 
the early 1980s and its relations with the state and other segments of the business community, 
see Yeçim Arat “Politics and Big Business: Janus-Faced Link to the State”, in Metin Heper, 
ed., Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The post-1980 Turkish Experience (Berlin, 
New York: de Gruyter, 1991), pp.134-147 and Tebnem Giilfidan Big Business and the State in 
Turkey: The Case of TÜSIAD (Istanbul: Bogaziçi University Press, 1993).
9 On the Turkish ISI experience in the 1960s/1970s see Henri Barkey, State and 



























































































the ISI model based on protectionism and a large internal market in the past 
became increasingly concerned with the negative side of ISI manifested by 
chronic shortages of foreign exchange and pronounced macroeconomic 
instability. The late 1970s constituted a period of severe economic and political 
crisis in Turkey and TUSIAD made its presence felt in the public scene as a key 
political actor through its widely advertized criticisms of the coalition 
government in power under the Premiership of Biilent Ecevit, in the midst of a 
political and economic crisis, during the course of 1979. The collapse of the 
government, in which the social democratic Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
was the major partner, shortly thereafter helped to create a powerful image of 
TUSIAD in public mind, as an organization which was so influential as to push 
democratically elected governments out of office 10.
It would be misleading in this context to classify TUSIAD as an 
association which pushed actively and explicitly for a bureaucratic authoritarian 
solution 11. Whilst members of the organization in broad terms were in favor of 
democracy, in principle, their fundamental concern was stability. Whenever the 
democratic order came into conflict with political and economic stability, they 
failed to resist overtly authoritarian solutions12.
The 1980s marked the second distinct phase in the evolution of the 
organization. The 1980s in Turkey represented a radical departure away from 
the inward oriented industrialization model of the 1970s, towards a more open, 
export-oriented model of accumulation. The early phase of this transformation 
occurred under a military government during the 1980-1983 era. Whilst 
TUSIAD was quite content with the stable macroeconomic and political 
environment created under the military rule and the onset of economic reforms, 
it was also quite apprehensive about the possibility of military rale on a longer-
10 For an evaluation of the TUSIAD-Ecevit controversy in the late 1970s, see Arat. For a more 
recent assessment and TUSlAD's supportive stand for Ecevit in the context of the 1999 
elections, see A. Rezzak Oral and Murat Sabuncu, "20 Yil Once 20 Yil Sonra", Milliyet Daily, 
Dec. 11,1998.
11 It is possible to argue that ODonnell's "bureaucratic authoritarian model" also applies to the 
Turkish case during the period, with the crisis of ISI clearly creating the background to the 
collapse of the democratic regime. Nonetheless, we ought to emphasize the important point 
that the military interlude in Turkey was a comparatively short-lived process compared to a 
number of key Latin American cases such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. For a 
comprehensive analysis of the role of the military during the post-1980 era both as an 
economic interest group and a political actor, see Gerassimos Karabelias, "The Evolution of 
Civil-Military Relations in Post-war Turkey, 1980-95", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 
4(1999)




























































































term basis for two main reasons. First, the potential for arbitrary government, 
beyond TUSiAD’s own sphere of control, which, by itself, is a major threat to 
stability and predictability both in political as well as economic terms, appeared 
to be stronger under a military government than a civilian government. Second, 
and equally important, was the concern that a period of prolonged military rule 
would signify isolation from the European Community as well as the 
international community at large with costly consequences 13.
Following the return to democracy in November 1983, TUSIAD 
continued to occupy significant public space as the decade unfolded. The 
organization made its appearance felt through its vocal criticisms of the return 
to populism under Ozal government, manifesting itself in terms of rising budget 
deficits and inflation towards the end of the decade 14 15. A conflict of interest also 
emerged during this particular phase between exporters (not necessarily being 
producers themselves) who grasped the main benefits of the new economic 
strategy during the 1980s and TUSlAD which embodied a significant group of 
inward oriented industrialists. The latter were quite resentful of what they 
regarded as excessive incentives granted to exporters, penalizing industrial 
production in the process ls.
Looking back, TUSIAD’s approach during these two early phases was 
primarily motivated and dictated by economic considerations. This was closely 
evident in the organization’s publications which concentrated almost 
exclusively on identifying major economic problems and providing appropriate 
solutions to such problems which would be beneficial not only to big business 
but also to society at large. A technocratic and economically oriented vision of
13 On the reasons for TOSIAD's reluctance to see a military government in office/power on a 
longer term basis, see Arat.
14 On TUSIAD and its criticisms of the Ozal government in late 1980s, see Arat and Gulfidan. 
On the broad contours and the principal dilemmas of Turkish neo-liberalism in the post-1980 
era see Ziya Onif, "Political Economy of Turkey in the 1980s: Anatomy of Unorthodox 
Liberalism" in Metin Heper, ed., Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The post-1980 
Turkish Experience (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1991) pp. 27-40, and "The Turkish 
Economy at the Tum of a New Century: Critical and Comparative Perspectives" in Morton 
Abramowitz, ed., Turkey's Transformation and American Policy (New York: The Century 
Foundation Press, 2000), pp. 95-115.
15 On the conflict between industrialists and exporters bringing TUSlAD into conflict with 
other business organizations such as Turk-trade during the period see Arat; Selim Ilkin, 
"Exporters: Favoured Dependency", in Metin Heper ed., Strong State and Economic Interest 
Groups: The post-1980 Turkish Experience (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1991), pp. 89-98; 
and Yilmaz Esmer, "Manufacturing Industries: Giants with Hesitant Voices" in Metin Heper, 
ed., Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The post-1980 Turkish Experience (Berlin, 




























































































society, which is in striking parallel especially with the rising neo-right and 
neo-liberal understanding of the post 1980 period, had been dominant in the 
reports of the Association in the periods concerned.
The 1990s, the third distinct phase in TUSiAD’s evolution, represented a 
marked departure from the previous two decades in the sense that an explicit 
agenda for democratization, involving a series of legal and constitutional reform 
proposals, became the focal point of the association’s activities. This is clearly 
evident from the organization’s publications as well as the public 
pronouncements of its leaders 16. This is not to suggest that TUSiAD’s interest 
in economic issues faded into the background. This is clearly not the case. The 
organization continued to display considerable interest in issues pertaining to 
the reform of state finances, the implementation of the Customs Union 
Agreement and other major economic indicators of the day. What is crucial for 
our purposes is that an explicit democratization agenda occupied a central stage 
during the course of the 1990s which, in turn, made a sharp contrast with the 
single-minded interest in economic issues that had characterized the 
association’s approach in the previous stages.
In retrospect, several distinct influences were responsible for the 
emergence of this apparent paradox. The first major force to underline in this 
context concerns the radical transformation of the external environment. The 
collapse of the Soviet model of development, the global spread of democracy, 
as well as the increasing emphasis placed by the European Union on democracy 
and human rights as a precondition for full-membership constituted key 
developments which deeply influenced the perceptions of business leaders. 
Turkey during the 1990s encountered not a single but effectively double 
external anchor in this context in the sense that the pressures stemming from 
globalization per se were merged and strengthened by the pressures originating 
from the European Union itself. Hence, perhaps the fundamental influence that 
helped to shape TUSiAD’s vision was the growing belief that the economic 
benefits of globalization would only be available on a large scale, if and only if 
democratic norms were fully applied in the political sphere.
On the domestic front, three separate yet interrelated influences may be 
identified. First TUSiAD’s commitment to democracy reflected a more 
fundamental concern, namely the question of legitimizing the position of big
16 During the 1971-1990 period TUSIAD has published a total of 93 reports all of which were 
almost exclusively on economic issues. In the post-1990 period, however, a distinct shift 
towards a democratization agenda would be discerned in TUSIAD publications. Out of 111 
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V.
o
business in society and to create a positive public image. A second key motive 
underlying TUSIAD’s commitment to democracy involved a project designed to 
check the power of the state and render the state more transparent and 
accountable. Although big business had prospered under the direct assistance of 
the state throughout the Republican era, it managed to attain a significant 
degree of maturity by the 1990s17. Big business was now composed of 
internationally competitive firms, with an increasingly global orientation. Its 
dependence on the state has been significantly reduced during the process. 
Hence, what these large entities needed from the state involved the creation of a 
predictable economic and legal environment as opposed to large favors often 
distributed on a highly arbitrary and clientelistic basis18 . Finally, TUSIAD 
conceived of democracy, a necessary component of which is a curtailment in the 
redistributive powers of the state, as a means of consolidating its own position 
against possible threats originating from other segments of society.
IV. TÜSÎAD’S VISION OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN RETROSPECT
We have tried to develop a coherent understanding of TUSiAD’s vision of 
democracy through an examination of some of its key publications, official 
statements and the pronouncements of the association’s leadership in public. 
Whilst TUSIAD reports are typically not produced by the organization’s own 
staff, being often commissioned to academics or other professionals in public or 
private institutions, the choice of critical issues for investigation, the approach 
adopted and solutions offered in these studies tend to reveal a great deal about 
TUSiAD’s priorities and its underlying vision of the liberal democratic order.
Our examination of TUSIAD’s “revealed preferences” suggests the 
presence of four distinct stages in the evolution of the association’s 
democratization agenda during the course of the 1990s. These four distinct
17 On the "maturity of capital" or "maturity of the 'bourgeoisie'" Çaglar Keyder, Ulusal 
Kalkinmacdigin Iflasi (Istanbul: Metis, 1995) or Nigel Harris, "New Bourgeoisies?" Journal 
of Development Studies, Voi. 24, No. 2, (1988), 137-149. On the authoritarian elements 
implicit in the previous era of "national developmentalism" in terms of restrictions placed on 
"civil" and "human rights" in spite of the presence of a strong emphasis on "social rights", see 
Immanuel Wallerstein, After Liberalism (New York: The New Press, 1995).
18 On the inherent uncertainty created by arbitrary government intervention and its negative 
ramifications for the business community see Bugra, State and Business in Modem Turkey: A 
Comparative Study, “Ideological and Political Contradictions of Capitalism in the Late 
Industrializing Countries”, and "Political Sources of Uncertainty in Business Life” in Metin 
Heper (ed.), Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The post-1980 Turkish Experience 




























































































stages may be delineated as follows: (a) a search for consensus in the early 
1990s (b) a focus on the reform of the state and the quality of governance 
particularly in the mid-1990s (c) the emergence of a radical agenda for 
democratization in 1997 and its immediate aftermath and finally, (d) a shift back 
to the earlier emphasis on the reform of the state and quality of governance 
towards the end of the decade. We may now investigate these four distinct 
stages in turn.
The 1990s started with TUSlAD’s search for “consensus” in Turkish 
society. A number of studies as well as a major conference held in the early 
1990s expressed the association’s desire to reach a consensus with other 
segments of the Turkish society in tackling the country’s major economic 
problems19 . This search for consensus resulted in a concrete proposal aimed at 
establishing institutionalized co-operation between representatives of different 
groups in society namely the Economic and Social Council, a proposal which 
has subsequently been accepted. The underlying motives for this search for 
consensus were twofold. First of all, it reflected the desire on the part of big 
business to consolidate its position in society, but at the same time, to influence 
the course of policy formation on key issues more directly through a novel 
extra-parliamentary institution. One can clearly detect a concern with stability 
as an underlying goal in these efforts to reach a consensus.
Towards the middle of the decade “reform of the state” and “quality of 
governance” emerged as the central tenets of TUSIAD’s democratization 
agenda. Heavily influenced by the ideology and rhetoric of neo-liberalism, the 
New Right and Buchanan style constitutional economics, TUSIAD’s vision of 
the optimal state involved a significant reduction in the overall weight of the 
state in economic affairs as a basis for a successfully functioning market 
economy 20. What the organization had in mind was the creation of a small state 
which would focus on a limited number of key objectives such as the provision 
of basic infrastructure and services, macroeconomic stability and a legal and 
regulatory framework necessary for the efficient operation of competitive 
markets. A great deal of emphasis was placed on the transparency and 
accountability of this “optimal state”. Parallel to this vision of the optimal state
19 On the search for consensus in the early 1990s, see TUSlAD, Sanayilefmede Yonetim ve 
Toplumsal Uzlajma (Istanbul: Turk Sanayicileri ve ijadamlan Demegi, 1992), Ulusal Katilim 
ve Uzlayma Sempozyumu (1992), Iyletme ve Ulusal Duzeyde ‘E$anlamh Uzlayma Modeli' 
(1993).
20 See highly publicized report on the "optimal state": TUSlAD, Optimal State: Towards a 





























































































was TOSIAD’s frequent technocratic emphasis on the quality of governance 
which essentially involved the transfer of high quality management styles and 
practices observed in the private sector to the public sector and to the political 
arena to improve the quality of services provided by the government at large21.
TUSIAD’s concern with the “optimal state” was reflected in a number of 
proposals designed to reform government finances and deal with the problem of 
chronic budget deficits and high inflation, a perennial problem ever since the 
late 1970s. The solutions offered appeared to be quite straightforward: 
privatization of public enterprises, economizing on government expenditures, 
reform of the social security system (which essentially involved a shift towards 
market based provision of social insurance) and tax reform Tax reform, in turn, 
would be synonymous with a reduction in the tax rate itself- reducing the tax 
burden on the private sector and on large firms, in particular- whilst broadening 
the tax base, a policy which would also help to reduce the large underground on 
informal economy in Turkey22.
Decentralization of public services and the need to increase the powers of local 
authorities were also emphasised 23. Yet another critical component involved a 
radical reform of the legal system. Once again the single-minded focus on 
“quality” was evident in attempts to reform the judicial framework24. A final 
ingredient, again reflecting a technocratic, institutional engineering approach, 
focused on the design of a new electoral system which would help to overcome 
the fragmented party system and the resultant wave of unstable coalition 
governments 25.
The almost single-minded focus on the part of TUSIAD on various 
dimensions of state reform were clearly motivated by a desire to achieve a 
stable and predictable economic, legal and political environment of the state.
21 For evidence on growing focus on quality of governance see TUSlAD, Toplam Kalite 
Yonetimi (1993), Diinya f  apinda bir Performansa Dogru (1995).
22 On the details of the reform of the state projects in the economic sphere and attempts to 
accomplish the move towards the optimal state in detail, see TUSIAD, 1980 Sonrasinda 
Kaynaklann Kamu ve Ozel Sektor arasmda Payla$imi (1996), Tiirkiye’de Kamu Harcamalari 
ve Kamu Borqlanmasi (1996), Emekli ve Mutlu.Tiirk Sosyal Guvenlik Sisteminin Sorunlan, 
Qozum Onerileri (1996).
23 For evidence on growing emphasis on decentralization of government services see 
TUSlAD, Local Government in Turkey: Problems and Solutions (1996), Yerel Yonetimler 
Yasa Taslagi (1997).
24 On the reform of the legal system see the report on ‘optimal state’.





























































































This would be the type of environment in which both businessmen and the 
public at large would be able to capitalize on the massive material benefits 
offered by economic globalization, in other words, helping Turkey to “catch the 
globalization train” 26. Also implicit in the vocabulary of the optimal state was a 
desire on the part of big business to protect itself from arbitrary and 
discriminatory behavior on the part of the state as well as from the distributional 
pressures and populist demands stemming from labor, farmers and other 
segments of society.
The publication of the report entitled “Perspectives on Democratization” 
published in 1997 reflected a radical departure from the earlier approaches and 
involved a heavy assault on the established state apparatus in Turkey27 . The 
report outlined a number of dramatic proposals designed to tackle certain 
inherent weaknesses of the existing democratic order, leading to a fundamental 
reordering of state-society and state-citizen relationships. The report’s extensive 
range of proposals ranged from constitutional reform, reform of the party 
system, the nature of civil-military relations and the language rights of the 
"Kurdish minority".
The uproar which the publication of the report created and criticisms 
from various segments of the public at large also brought into the forefront 
divisions within the organization itself. In general, whilst the younger 
generation businessmen were more supportive of the radical democratization 
agenda, older generation industrialists were much more apprehensive about 
adopting a critical attitude towards the state on which they had depended so 
heavily on the past and continued to depend on, if to a lesser extent, during the 
current era28. Consequently the latter category was highly critical of the content
26 See in this regard the article reflecting views of Feyyaz Berker, one of the ‘founding fathers 
of TUSiAD’, “Globalle$en Dunyanm Yolu Avrupa’dan Ge$er”, Liberal Bakif, Feb. 15, 1998 
and the article reflecting the views of then the president of TUSIAD, Muharrem Kayhan, 
"TUrkiye Demokrasi ile Gelitir", Hiirses Daily, Feb.25, 1998.
27 See, TUSiAD, Tiirkiye’de Demokratikletme Perspektifleri (1997). In fact this was not the 
only report involved, although it was the most publicized among others including Demekler 
Kanunu Taslagi, Yerel Yonetimler Yasa Taslagi, Memur Yargilamasi Hakkinda, Ombudsman 
Kurumu Incelemesi, Siyasal Partiler Yasai and Seqimler, TBMM ve Hiikumet Sistemleri 
(1997).
28 For evidence on divisions within TUSiAD itself, which bacame appearent following the 
publication of the report on democratization, see “Paket TUSiAD Genel Kurulu’nu tkiye 
Boldii”, Finansal Forum, Jan. 24, 1997; “Demokrasi TUSlAD’i Salladi”, Milliyet Daily, Jan. 
24,1997; “Rapor TUSlAD’i Boldii”, Sabah Daily, Jan. 24, 1997 and “TUSiAD Raporu 




























































































of the report itself as well as attempts to associate the whole of the organization 
with the reform agenda identified.
The publication of TUSIAD’s “democratization” report occurred at a time 
when the Customs Union with the EU was already established and the next step 
in line appeared to be full-membership of the Union. The logic implicit in the 
report is that there is a need to conform to global norms, not only in the 
economic sphere, but also in the spheres of civil and human rights if the country 
were to make progress and establish itself as a global player of significant 
standing 29. Whilst we do not wish to deny that individual members of TUSlAD 
are genuinely committed to the principles of liberal democracy, there exists a 
certain instrumental view of democracy implicit in this scenario. In other words, 
democracy is conceived as a mechanism for reaching the ultimate goals 
involving the benefits of full EU membership and economic globalization at 
large.
Following the criticisms which accompanied the publication of 
TUSIAD’s report on democratization both from within as well as from outside, 
from influential circles such as the military, TUSlAD has tended to underplay 
its radical agenda towards the end of the decade. A certain U-turn towards the 
technocratic or the economistic approach involving a renewed focus on the 
reform of the state and quality of governance is evident from the association’s 
most recent publications and activities30 . On the basis of these observations and 
arguments, we may argue that democratization was conceived of as an 
instrument and not as an ultimate objective in itself by TUSlAD. Indeed, key 
public pronouncements of TUSIAD leadership also testify the view that the 
association has conceived democracy an instrument for establishing an effective 
and well-functioning market economy and satisfy the norms of the global 
market31.
29 Importance of the EU norms has been highlighted in the Democratization Report.
30 For evidence of a shift back to quality of governance argument in the late 1990s, see 
TUSIAD Yargilama Duzeninde Kalite (1998). Also relevant in this context is the ‘National 
Quality Congress’ held with great contributions from TUSIAD, details of which can be found 
at “Hukuk Sistemi Kalite Kongresi’nin Gundeminde”, Finansal Forum, Sep. 2, 1998. We 
should also draw attention to a much recent conference organized at the auspices of TUSIAD 
entitled ‘Towards European Union; Towards Good Governance”, Sep. 19, 2000.
31 See '"insan Haklan ve Demokrasi Ekonominin Oniindeki Engel’", Milliyet Daily, Feb. 25, 
1998; "TUSIAD insan Haklan Istiyor", Yeni Yiizyil Daily, Feb. 25, 1998; and "Demokrasi 




























































































V. TUSIAD, INTRA-CAPITAL CONFLICTS AND DEMOCRACY
An interesting feature of the Turkish case with regard to business-democracy 
relationship is the impossibility of talking about a unified and ideologically 
homogenous business class or “bourgeoisie”, a fact which challenges or does 
not fit into the standard theories about the development and maturity of the 
bourgeoisie. Certainly one may observe certain divisions and points of contest 
between different business groups in many national settings. Nonetheless the 
Turkish context goes far beyond such minor differences or conflicts. Rather, 
two very distinct groups of business, based on their economic activities, goals 
and the way they approach the state as well as their life styles and ideological 
orientations emerged in Turkey especially in the post-1980 period.
Hence a major test of TUSlAD’s democratic credentials came about with 
the emergence of MUSIAD, a business association with an Islamist orientation, 
in the context of the 1990s.32 3. In retrospect, the rise of MUSIAD during the 
decade was closely associated with the challenge of small-scale “Anatolian 
capital” -the so called “Anatolian tigers”- in novel centers of industrial growth 
33. MUSIAD membership consists of predominantly small and medium scale 
firms, but also includes a limited number of rather large companies. The 
organization developed close links with the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) and 
became increasingly influential during the mid-1990s as the Welfare Party 
established itself as a major force in Turkish politics, following its electoral 
surge in the municipal elections of March 1994 and the general elections of 
December 1995 34. Its influence reached a peak during the short lived and the 
highly controversial coalition government in which the Welfare Party and the 
right of center True Path Party (DYP) participated as the dominant and the 
minor partners respectively.
MUSI AD’s fortunes received a massive blow, however, following the 
collapse of the coalition government in July 1997 and the subsequent closure of
32 MUSIAD stands for Mustakil Sanayici ve l$adamlan Demegi (Independent Industrialists 
and Businessmen’s Association). It was founded in 1990.
33 On Anatolian tigers and novel centres of industrial growth, see Ahmet Kose and Ahmet 
Oncii, "Diinya ve Turkiye Ekonomisinde Anadolu imalat Sanayii: Zenginlejmenin mi Yoksa 
Yoksulla$manm mi E$igindeyiz", Toplum ve Bilim, 77 (Summer 1998), 135-158; Alpay 
Filiztekin and insan Tunali, "Anatolian Tigers: Are They for Real?", New Perspectives on 
Turkey, 20 (Spring 1999), 77-106 and Ay$e Bugra, "The Claws of the Tigers," Private View 
Vol.4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 50-55.
34 On the rise of the Welfare Party (RP) during the period and the organic MUSiAD/RP link 
see Ziya Oni( "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the 




























































































the Welfare Party in January 1998. The military, as a major force in Turkish 
politics and a key component of the established state, exercised a powerful -if 
indirect- influence in this process 35. Following the so called “February 28 
process”, the activities of business establishments with close links to MUSlAD 
came under the increasing scrutiny of state agencies, resulting in a relative 
decline of the membership to the organization towards the end of the decade 36. 
Looking back, a number of remarkable contrasts may be identified between the 
two associations which effectively dominated the business side of political 
equation37. TUSIAD is unambiguously a representative of large-scale business 
in Turkey. The size of its membership is comparatively small, being confined to 
around 450 large establishments. Furthermore, membership is heavily 
concentrated in Istanbul and the adjacent cities of the Marmara region, by far 
the most prosperous parts of the country. Whilst, the membership size is small, 
its overall impact on the economy is immense. An indication of TUSIAD’s 
weight in the Turkish economy is evident from the fact that member companies 
accounted for 40.9 percent of total value added in manufacturing, construction 
and banking services based on a survey conducted in 1997.
MUSIAD, in contrast, enjoys a larger membership. Indeed, its 
membership size reached a peak of some 3000 establishments during the mid- 
1990s. Whilst Istanbul is heavily represented, the organization’s membership, in 
striking contrast to TUSIAD, is dispersed all over the country. MUSIAD’s 
presence is particularly pronounced in the new centers of industrial growth in 
the inner Anatolia region, representing the economic and political challenge of 
the rising “Anatolian capital”. The term “Anatolian tigers” largely signified a 
pattern of growth based on relatively small but externally competitive firms 
which prospered in the context of the neo-liberal policy regime instituted in the 
post-1980 era, but surprisingly with little or no help from the state38.
35 On the details of the February 28 Process see Metin Heper and Aylin Giiney, "The Military 
and Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience", Armed Forces and 
Society, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Summer 2000).
36 For evidence on the decline of MtfSiAD membership see interview with Ali Bayramoglu, 
MUSIAD Chairman, August 15, 2000.
37 On TUSIAD versus MUSIAD, see Ziya Oni?, "The Political Economy of Islamic 
Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective"; Ay$e Bugra, "Class, 
Culture and the State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business 
Associations," International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 30 (November 1998), 521- 
539.





























































































The overall weight of MUSIAD membership in the Turkish economy is 
marginal compared to the overall contribution of TUSiAD membership. 
Nonetheless, the organization manages to account for nearly 10 percent of GNP 
and, hence, clearly represented a potential challenge to the interests of the big 
business community.MUSIAD, on the economic plane, demanded the allocation 
of a larger share of government incentives and financial resources towards small 
and medium scale enterprises. In the political sphere, the association pushed for 
the enlargement of religious freedoms and in the process, challenged the secular 
character of the Turkish state. At least well into the 1990s, MtJSIAD, unlike its 
rival, was not explicitly concerned with issues relating to civil or individual 
rights. Unlike TUSiAD which had an explicitly pro-Westem orientation, the 
association during the peak of its influence resorted to a strong anti-Western 
rhetoric39. Indeed, successful models of East Asian style capitalism constituted 
a primary reference point. The success of these models was interpreted as a sign 
that conservative communitarian values, as opposed to the predominantly 
individualistic ethics of the West could be a significant resource for economic 
development40. Again very much in line with the basic stance of the Welfare 
Party, MUSIAD, during the peak of its influence desired a reorientation of 
Turkey’s economic (and political) relations towards the Middle East and Islamic 
World in general.
This is not the place to enter into a long debate on secularism versus 
Islam which has deep historical roots in the Turkish modernization process41 . 
What is important to emphasize is that the intensification of the Islam versus 
secularism conflict during the 1990s embodied an explicit political economy 
dimension. Stated somewhat differently, intra-capital conflicts involving 
different segments of the business community was at the heart of what 
superficially appeared to be purely a super-structural contest based on culture
39 On MUSIAD’s perspectives on the economic and political order see regular bulletin of the 
Organization entitled "Biilten'', recent issues of which have placed special emphasis on 
democratization, human rights and extension of religious freedoms. On the economic front, 
MUSIAD publishes an annual report on the Turkish economy as well as additional studies on 
a number of key issues. Special emphasis is placed in these reports on the need to achieve 
macroeconomic stability and direction of public resources towards small and medium scale 
enterprises. In fact, it is the latter element which tends to distinguish MUSlAD sharply from 
its principal rival TUSiAD.
40 See Erol Yarar, a former chairman of MUSIAD, on the virtues of East Asian style of 
capitalism, 21. Yiizyila Girerken Diinyaya Yeni Bir Bakif (Istanbul: Miistakil Sanayici ve 
ijadamlan Demegi, 1996)
41 On the history of secularism versus Islamism in the Turkish modernization project, see 




























































































and identity. These intra-capital conflicts may also explain the oscillations in 
TUSIAD’s democratization agenda and some of the ambiguities underlying the 
association’s democratization project itself. Particularly striking in the latter 
context is the comparatively liberal attitude towards the Kurdish issue and the 
question of minority rights versus the rather tough stance taken in support of 
secularism against the Islamist opposition. It is interesting to note, however, that 
TUSIAD leadership itself would deny the existence of intra-capital conflicts. 
When confronted with such questions in public, the typical reaction of the 
organization’s leadership is that the only meaningful distinction one can 
effectively make between different types of capital is between legitimate versus 
illegitimate business practices42 . According to TUSIAD, a number of key 
MUSIAD members have been guilty of illegitimate practices, involving, among 
other things, illegal fund raising operations as well as widespread tax evasion 
and participation in the underground economy. Not surprisingly, TUSIAD has 
not opposed active repression by state against MUSIAD in the context of the 
late 1990s.
We would concur with some of the key points made by TUSIAD 
leadership concerning illegitimate practices on the part of certain businesses 
with an Islamist orientation, in the economic sphere. We would also endorse the 
proposition that secularism is a precondition for a democratic constitutional 
order. What is interesting for our purposes is that TUSIAD needed the state to 
protect itself against this challenge which, in turn, tended to restrict its own 
ability to challenge the state and established boundaries of state-citizen 
relationship. One could go further and argue that TUSIAD itself has failed to 
address effectively the type of economic issues, such as the relative neglect of 
small and medium scale firms as a part of the state, an issue which MUSiAD in 
spite of inherent limitations of its democratic vision has effectively drawn 
attention to.
42 TUSlAD's implicit criticisms of MUSIAD have been based on the distinction between 
legitimate versus illegitimate business practices. Underlying these criticisms is the fact that 
some MUSIAD members have practiced illegitimate fund raising practices. On this distinction 
between legitimate versus illegitimate business practices as opposed to different types (and 
colors!) of capital, see Yiicaoglu interview on CNN Turk. Indeed, TUSIAD approached the 
issue from the same perspective in 1998, when some of the members of MUSIAD was 
arrested because of their illegal practices. See in this regard, “Sermayenin Rengi Olmaz”, 




























































































VI. BUSINESS AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL NEO­
LIBERALISM: BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE TÜSÎAD CASE
It is the common experience of late industrializing countries that private 
business or the entrepreneurial class develops under the close guidance and 
influence of the state. The state provides a variety of subsidies and incentives 
for the nascent private sector and protects it through a variety of different 
mechanisms against external competition. During the early stages of 
industrialization and capital accumulation, private sector or the “bourgeoisie” is 
heavily dependent on the state and, hence, the state is very much the dominant 
partner in the relationship which forms the basis of the national 
developmentalism project. As private capital matures over time, however, and 
increasingly takes on the role of a global actor, it becomes progressively less 
dependent on the state as alternative means of access to finance become 
available such as participating in strategic alliances with transnational 
corporations or borrowing directly from banks. As private capital attains a 
certain level of maturity, it also starts to challenge its dependent status and its 
subordinate relationship with the state. Consequently, the push for 
democratization becomes an instrument for restraining the state and 
accomplishing a fundamental restructuring of the organic relationship between 
big business and the state, involving a redefinition of the scope and boundaries 
of state intervention. Stated somewhat differently, as big business establishes 
itself as a global actor, it demands a new type of state. What is required is a 
limited state which, nevertheless, is transparent, accountable and establishes the 
rule of law for all segments of capital and, hence, plays an instrumental role in 
creating a stable and predictable environment under which private capital may 
flourish.
A domestic political economy explanation of the push for 
democratization on the part of big business is incomplete, however, in so far as 
it fails to take into account the powerful pressures stemming from different 
dimensions of globalization itself. The experience of TUSiAD in Turkey clearly 
provides support for the “maturity of capital” thesis. However, TUSIAD’s 
emergence as a major force within the pro-democratization coalition in the 
1990s needs to be explained also with reference to the instrumental role that 
democracy can play in terms of capitalizing on the potential economic benefits 
of globalization and EU membership. We may argue in hindsight that in the 
absence of such powerful sources of external stimuli, TUSIAD’s push for 
democratization might have taken a much more subdued form and would 





























































































Shifting our attention away from the origins of big business’ push for 
democratization to its actual impact on the course of democratization itself, 
what seems to emerge points towards a rather paradoxical pattern. On a 
favorable note, TUSIAD has perhaps been the most vocal force within civil 
society and possibly the polity at large in Turkey for pushing in the direction of 
the extension of civil and human rights as well as the establishment of a 
transparent and accountable state. The Association’s influence has been 
accentuated by its financial resources and superior organizational and 
mobilizational capacities compared with other business associations or other 
groups within civil society. Indeed, TUSIAD’s lead in this respect has been 
closely followed by other business associations, including MUSiAD, as well as 
agencies within the state as they have started to produce their own agendas for 
democratization towards the end of the decade43.
This rather benign interpretation of TUSiAD's role as a pro­
democratization force needs to be qualified, however, in a number of important 
respects. One could argue that TUSIAD has been more forthcoming on 
democracy than any other institution on Turkey simply because for most 
dissidents the price of opposition was quite high. TUSiAD, by virtue of its 
privileged status with respect to the state, was by definition immune to the 
possibility of state repression. Indeed, on the negative side of the balance sheet, 
one could draw attention to certain inherent ambiguities in TUSiAD's approach 
to democratization. A striking example of such an ambiguity concerns the 
relatively liberal attitude adopted towards the issue of the cultural rights of the 
Kurdish population versus the comparatively tough stance taken on the 
interpretation of secularism and against the Islamist opposition. At no stage, for 
instance, did TUSiAD oppose the closure of the Islamist Welfare Party in 
January 1998 on the grounds that party closure itself is something which is 
incompatible with the principles of liberal democracy. Furthermore, one should 
draw attention to the relatively subdued manner with which TUSiAD has tried 
to carry out its democratization agenda following the publication of a rather 
radical report in 1997. In fact, concrete steps on the direction of accomplishing 
the democratization agenda such as offering support to dissidents or actively 
condemning the state for unnecessary acts of repression seem to be absent in the
43 For evidence on the recent push for democratization on the part of other actors following 
the original impetus provided by TUSIAD, notably by MUSIAD, other business associations 
and agencies within the state, see MUSIAD, Anayasa Reformu ve Yonetimin 
Demokratikletmesi (Istanbul: Miistakil Sanayici ve l§adamlan Demegi, 2000); TUGlAD, 
2000'li Yillara Dogru Tiirkiye'nin Onde Gelen Sorunlanna Yaklafimlar XU: Insan Haklan ve 
Demokratikleyme (Istanbul: Turkiye Gen? l§adamlan Demegi, 1995); and TOBB, Dogu 




























































































post-1997 context. For an external observer, this obviously raises serious 
question marks concerning TUSIAD's true democratic credentials.
In retrospect, the ambivalent stance of TUSiAD with respect to 
democratization may be explained by the fact that the dependence of big 
business on the state has not been totally eliminated. Many TUSIAD members 
continue to benefit from clientelistic ties, state patronage and protection. A 
number of TUSIAD members also have close links with the military which is an 
important economic actor in the Turkish context. Although their rhetoric 
suggests that they are interested in a more rational or better-governed state as 
well as greater privatization, there are numerous instances of TUSIAD members 
appealing to various state institutions to defend their particular interests. It 
would be interesting, for example, to raise the question of how many TUSiAD 
members have actually benefited from the socialization of their losses by the 
state in the context of recent bank failures. Hence, contradictory behavior may 
be discerned in TUSIAD's approach to the issue of establishing an accountable 
state based on even application of laws and equal access to accurate 
information. A serious problem facing Turkish business in recent years has been 
the overt attempt by large holding companies to acquire media companies for 
the explicit purpose of supporting other business ventures, diffusing false 
information about competitors and putting pressure on political actors to their 
bidding. This is not exactly the type of behavior that an organization interested 
in greater transparency ought to endorse. Stated somewhat differently, the 
charge of illegitimate business ethics or practices often leveled against 
MUSiAD may also be directed towards certain TUSiAD members themselves.
These observations tend to highlight the inherent dilemma that an 
organization such as TUSIAD faces. Whilst long-term interests of TUSIAD 
members are in the direction of establishing a more accountable state and better 
governance, concrete steps in this direction are often nor welcomed by many 
individual members given their continued dependence on state resources. This 
observations also implies that it might be highly misleading to view TUSIAD as 
a unitary actor given the wide variations that exist in its membership profile not 
only in terms of the degree of dependence on the state but also on the basis of 
other key attributes such as degree of external market orientation and belonging 
to a younger or older generation category.
The question of EU membership once again becomes a cmcial 
consideration in this context. The prospect of EU membership is undoubtedly a 
major catalyst in overcoming TUSIAD's inherent ambiguities. To the extent that 
TUSIAD members are keen to proceed on this path they are likely to push the 
state to democratize itself. Whilst the EU constitutes a powerful external 




























































































membership, there are certain divisions within TUSIAD and the Turkish 
community itself although the degree of disagreement has become much less 
visible in recent years. Secondly and far more significant is the strength of the 
signals provided by the EU for the eventual Turkish membership. If for a 
variety of reasons such signals tend to be subdued or ambiguous, this also 
creates disincentives for business associations like TUSIAD to push seriously in 
the direction of democratic openings.
Perhaps, on a more fundamental note, one of the paradoxes of 
democratization in the age of global neo-liberalism is that democracy seems to 
entail an expansion of certain types of individual rights, such as “property 
rights” and “civil and human rights” and contraction of other types of rights 
such as “social rights”. This general tendency is also reflected in TUSIAD’s 
approach to democratization in the Turkish context. A close inspection suggests 
that there is little concrete reference to the problem of pronounced income 
inequality, both interclass and inter regional, which constitutes one of the major 
ills of the Turkish society44 . Indeed, there is little room for income 
redistribution and the provision of social safety nets in TUSIAD’s vision of the 
optimal state. This raises the rather profound question of whether it is possible 
to talk meaningfully about the extension of civil and human rights and 
recognition of different identities if such recognition does not result in a 
corresponding capacity for claiming a larger share of public resources or the 
material benefits available. In other words, we might be observing the 
emergence of a model of “democracy without citizenship”. In such a model 
there is no serious threat to the problem to the position of business in society, 
but at the same time within a significantly compressed public space there is no 
room for the effective participation of the vast majority of the population 
either45 . Perhaps this constitutes the single most important criticism that can be 
leveled at TUSIAD style democracy, a criticism which, in turn, has greater
44 For evidence on income inequality in Turkey which is indeed one of the highest in the 
world, see Zehra Kasnakoglu, "Income Distribution in Turkey: Who Gets What?", Private 
View 4/5, No:3 (Autumn 1997), pp.56-62; the latest estimate suggest an overall gini 
coefficient of 0.51 suggesting a high degree of relative income inequality. We need to 
emphasize that as the article was prepared, we have been informed about a forthcoming 
TUSIAD publication which will deal explicitly with the issue of income inequality in Turkey.
45 For a useful application of the concept of involving "democracy without citizenship" to 
Latin America, see Paul Cammack, "Democratization and Citizenship in Latin America", in 
Geraint Parry and Michael Moran, eds., Democracy and Democratization (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1994) pp.174-195. Also relevant in this context is Richard Falk, "The 





























































































applicability to the type of democracy which seems to be emerging under global 
neo-liberalism in general.
VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Democratic vision of the entrepreneurs in Turkey is shaped under the influence 
of domestic as well as powerful international or global factors. On the 
international front, while the crystallizing rales and norms of global neo­
liberalism necessitate a certain type of democracy in order not to be deprived of 
the benefits of globalization, the European Union, and economic benefits 
associated with full membership of this Union, as a second powerful anchor, 
forces TUSIAD to actively push for democracy. On the domestic front, to be 
better able to consolidate its status and power inside the national borders and 
escape from the authoritarian surveillance of the state, big business wants to 
restrict the state by the force of (rale of) law and democracy. Nonetheless, 
democracy, as understood by big business, besides being a tool to restrict the 
state, should also be instrumental in preventing possible threats to the position 
of big business in society arising from popular groups or other segments of 
capital. From a normative standpoint, a favorable outcome of these 
developments concerns a significant push on the part of big business towards 
the extension of individual rights, especially in the domains of civil and human 
rights.
This new understanding of democracy is certainly not specific to the 
Turkish big business. By contrast, it spreads with a considerable speed as the 
norms and codes of neo-liberal ideology as well as economic practice spread, by 
acquiring a truly global status. Therefore, ‘democracy’, originating from the 
logic of market and working in accordance with the requirements of the global 
neo-liberalism, becomes more a matter of procedure to justify, consolidate and 
regulate the existence and ideology of the market, whilst at the same time 
resulting in a certain expansion of individual and civil rights. The ‘losers’ of a 
market oriented system, or a globalized capital, in this new democracy, will 
have limited rights or alternatives to stand against, at least within the contours 
of the nation state, the serious threats, posed by neo-liberal globalization.
Ziya Oni§
K0 9  University, Turkey
Umut Tiirem
K0 9  University, Turkey
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